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Abstract  
 
This paper contrasts expectations derived from the theoretical literature on emergence of new 
modes of governance with empirical evidence, using data from empirical research on the 
adoption of and adaptation to EU environmental legislation during the EU accession process. 
The theoretical literature suggests that the huge costs implied by the compliance with EU 
directives and the weak state capacities available in the accession countries would encourage 
the emergence of new modes of governance. Empirical evidence from Hungary, Poland and 
Romania, however, shows that this is not the case. Institutional legacies, the simultaneity of 
transition and accession, and the time pressure to transfer the demanding EU regulations 
partially explain this observation. Most importantly, this paper finds that cooperation is most 
likely in those cases where at least a certain level of capacities is available to authorities, 
enabling them to remain in charge of the policy process.   3
1.  Introduction 
 
Accession appears to be both a blessing and a curse to transition countries aspiring to become 
members of the European Union. On the one hand, the implementation of the acquis supports 
their transformation from authoritarian regimes with state controlled economies into liberal 
democracies with market economies. On the other hand, the accession countries face great 
difficulties in restructuring their economic and political institutions in order to meet the 
conditions for EU membership. The adoption of and adaptation to the acquis run into serious 
problems concerning both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of EU policies. Since these 
countries are “weak” states that often lack the absorption capacity (resources) rather than the 
willingness to effectively implement EU policies, accession problems cannot simply be solved in 
the “shadow of hierarchy” (command and control). Alternative modes of governance based on 
non-hierarchical steering that systematically involve private actors in policy-making could be 
more effective in helping to ensure the adaptation of and adoption to the acquis.  
In this paper we focus on the Eastern Enlargement process in Poland, Hungary and Romania 
and seek to explore the relevance of the non-hierarchical involvement of private actor in policy-
making for the effective implementation of the acquis communautaire.
 How important have non-
hierarchical modes of governance really been in the accession process? Have voluntary 
agreements, financial assistance, benchmarking, naming and shaming, technology-transfers, 
information exchange, and processes of (public) persuasion resulted in more effective 
implementation than command and control regulations? Which role have public-private 
partnerships played between public authorities, on the one hand, and policy consultancies, 
companies and NGOs, on the other hand? Have there been attempts of economic and 
(transnational) societal actors to compensate weak state capacities by establishing private regimes, 
and have they been effective? 
This paper summarizes the main findings of expanded empirical case studies
1 regarding the 
adoption of adaptation to six EU directives in Hungary, Poland and Romania.
2 Starting from 
insights of the theoretical literature on the emergence of new modes of governance, we contrast 
our theoretical assumptions with empirical evidence on the scarcity of their emergence during the 
accession process. The first part briefly outlines the theoretical and analytical framework on 
which the research has been based. In the second part we shortly outline the problems the 
Central and Eastern European countries faced during the accession process, in particular 
concerning the restructuring of environmental legislation. Then we give an overview of our 
findings in the three countries under scrutiny. The paper concludes with some considerations on 
factors hindering and fostering the emergence of new modes of governance.  
                                                 
1   The case studies focus on six environmental directives and were elaborated in the framework of the research 
Project “Coping with Accession: New Modes of Governance and Enlargement” (COPA) that is co-funded by 
the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme, Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in 
the Knowledge-based Society, Project no. CITI-CT-2004-506392. For further information see http://www.eu-
newgov.org. The case studies on Poland, Hungary and Romania are coordinated by Tanja A. Börzel at the Free 
University Berlin.  
2   The cases studies are based on empirical research concerning the following six Directives: Drinking Water 
(Directive 98/83/EC on the quality of water intended for human consumption), Large Combustion Plants-
Directive (LCP) 2001/80/EC, Environmental Impact Assessment-Directive (EIA) 97/11/EC, FFH/Wildbirds-
Directive 92/43/EEC, Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC establishing a Framework for the 
Community Action on Water), IPPC Directive 96/61/EC concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control.   4
2. Mission Impossible? Defining New Modes of Governance  
 
There is a Babylonian variety of definitions and understandings of what new modes of 
governance are and what makes them really new as compared to traditional modes. Part of the 
confusion is related to the existence of a broad and a narrow understanding of governance, the 
latter of which is identical with what is usually understood as “new” modes of governance. This is 
not the place to rehearse the entire debate (for an overview see (Börzel, 1998)
3. For the purpose 
of studying the role of new modes of governance in EU enlargement, we adopt the following 
definition. New modes of governance refer to the making and implementation of collectively 
binding decisions (based or not based on legislation) that: 
1.  are not hierarchically imposed, i.e. each actor involved has a formal or de facto veto in policy-
making and voluntarily complies with the decisions made, and 
2.  systematically  involve private actors, for profit (e.g. firms) and not for profit (e.g. non-
governmental organizations) in policy formulation and/or implementation. 
Non-hierarchical coordination is constitutive for new modes of governance. It is “governance 
without government” (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), which refers to a mode of political steering 
that does not authoritatively impose policies but is based on voluntary cooperation.  
We can distinguish between two forms of non-hierarchical steering or modes to voluntarily engage 
actors in a particular behaviour that is deemed necessary to address a policy problem: 
-  the setting of positive and negative incentives, e.g. through side-payments, issue-linkage or 
sanctions, which changes the cost-benefit calculations of actors in favour of the desired 
behaviour, without affecting their preferences over outcomes; 
-  non-manipulative persuasion and social learning through which actors are convinced to 
change their preferences over outcomes in a way that concurs to the desired behaviour. 
Understanding new modes of governance as the involvement of private actors in public policy-
making through non-hierarchical coordination covers a wide range of potential arrangements. In 
order to avoid concept stretching, however, certain forms remain outside this definition. We 
exclude the lobbying and mere advocacy activities of non-state actors aimed at governments as 
well as supranational and international organizations. Private actors who are not active 
participants in governance arrangements or negotiating systems pose few challenges to existing 
concepts and theories in political science and international relations. Also excluded are those 
arrangements among private actors that  
-  are based on self-coordination and do not aim at the provision of common goods and 
services (markets); 
-  produce public goods and services as unintended consequences (e.g., rating agencies) or 
provide public “bads” (mafia, drug cartels, transnational terrorism).  
Reasons for why state actors seek to involve non-state actors in public policy-making are usually 
derived from three different strands of theory. Transaction cost theory argues that state actors 
delegate public tasks because they want to reduce transaction costs imposed by lengthy decision-
making processes in the parliament or within the government itself (Eppstein and O'Halloran, 
1999). Principal-agent theory emphasizes the lack of information, expertise and/or time of the 
state principal in dealing with complex problems. Delegation does not only help the state to 
compensate for its weak capacities. It also allows to lock-in policies and protect them from 
                                                 
3  Cf. Börzel, Guttenbrunner and Seper (2005): “Conceptualizing New Modes of Governance in EU 
Enlargement”, http://www.eu-newgov.org/datalists/deliverables_detail.asp?Project_ID=12.    5
changing political majorities (Moe, 1987). Network approaches highlight the functional 
interdependence of public and private actors in policy-making (cf. (Mayntz, 1997, Börzel, 1998)). 
Governments become increasingly dependent upon the cooperation and joint resource 
mobilization of policy actors outside their hierarchical control. Involving non-state actors in the 
policy process allows state actors to establish “webs of relatively stable and ongoing relationships 
which mobilize and pool dispersed resources so that collective (or parallel) action can be 
orchestrated toward the solution of a common policy” (Kenis and Schneider, 1991): 36). Next to 
tapping into the resources of non-state actors, their participation in the policy process helps to 
ensure effective implementation. The more the actors affected by a policy have a say in decision-
making, the more likely they are to accept the policy outcome to be implemented, even if their 
interests may not have been fully accommodated. In sum, New Modes of Governance can 
significantly strengthen the capacity of state actors in public policy-making (cf. (Héritier, 2003). 
The main incentive for non-state actors to get involved in the public policy-making is the 
exchange of their resources for influence on the policies by which they are affected. 
While offering clear-cut explanations on co-operation, principal agent theory also gives hints on 
some risks that might arise from delegation. Among many other possibilities, state actors might 
suspect non-state actors of defection or be afraid of state capture, non-state actors at their turn 
might expect other non-state actors to shirk or free ride. Another strain within the literature used 
by recent governance research highlights also the critical role of the state for establishing “new 
modes of governance”, claiming that these need at least a “shadow of hierarchy” (Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1985: 25); (Mayntz, 1995: 163); (Scharpf, 1993) in order to materialise. Most of the 
literature focusing on new modes of governance has been used to analyse legitimate, weberian 
type of states located mostly in the Western hemisphere. If “new modes of governance” are also 
viable solutions in states with weaker capacities – like those in Central and Eastern Europe – is 
still an open question.  
3. The Beauty and the Beast: EU environmental acquis meeting weak state capacities  
 
The promise of EU membership has been the main political driving force leading the 10 Eastern 
European accession states during their overlapping transition and “Europeanization” period. 
Driven by rational and idealistic motivations, the EU adaptation process started well before the 
accession negotiations were closed (Schimmelfennig, 2001, Moravcsik and Vachudova, 2003). 
While this process was rather selective, after the opening of accession negotiations the adaptation 
of the overall EU legislation became a top priority for CEE policymakers (Börzel and Sedelmeier, 
2006: 63). In contrast to former enlargement rounds, as in the case of Spain, Portugal and 
Greece, the CEE states had to adopt the whole body of EU law already before their accession 
date. This asymmetric, one-way and top-down process between EU and the applicant states was 
enforced by the  rather strict accession conditionality and the EU’s distinctive emphasis on the 
development of administrative capacities in the CEE states (Dimitrova, 2002).  
Accession conditionality is widely regarded as being the decisive factor in influencing domestic 
reforms in the accession candidates.
4 The Commission and the member states closely monitored 
the legal implementation of the acquis communautaire, which became the central criteria for 
membership towards the end of the accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 
2005). The “carrot” of EU membership perspective provided a huge incentive for the accession 
states to adjust to Europe and to “download” policies in the various sectors. The “stick” of 
conditionality meant at the same time that EU rules and norms had to be adopted in a rather 
                                                 
4 “Acquis conditionality” is not the only way by which the EU has sought to transfer its acquis communautaire. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) contrast their incentive model of conditionality with two alternative 
models based on social learning and lesson drawing.  
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inflexible way and under high time pressure. In order to help accession countries comply with the 
Copenhagen criteria, the EU installed several capacity-building mechanisms that could work as 
positive incentives. Grabbe identifies five “mechanisms of Europeanization” at work, namely 
models (provision of legislative and institutional templates), money (aid and technical assistance), 
benchmarking and monitoring, advice and twinning, and gate keeping (access to negotiations and 
further stages in the accession process) (Grabbe, 2003).  
The enlargement of EU environmental policies was facing a complex and ambiguous 
environmental situation in the Central and Eastern Europe. On the one hand, the CEE countries 
enrich the EU with vast areas of pristine wilderness, large spots of untouched nature and an 
impressively high biodiversity. On the other hand, they suffer from the socialist legacy of forced 
and intensive industrialization leading to a significant number of environmental hotspots in the 
region. After the regime change and during market liberalization, most CEE countries witnessed 
a period of “natural clean-up” due to the breakdown of the state economy. With economic 
growth taking up in the second half of the 1990s, however, they started to experience similar 
environmental problems as the old member states did decades before. While some of the CEE 
countries had developed environmental regulations back in the 1970s, their effectiveness 
remained limited and did not meet the requirements of the environmental acquis communautaire. 
Environmental policy-making was largely carried out reactively by using end of pipe approaches 
and was based in general on command and control measures resonating well with the long 
standing traditions of paternalistic states (Caddy, 2000). 
The EU accession process starting towards the end of the nineties implied that the CEE states 
were confronted with the challenge of implementing some 200 environmental directives. This 
transfer of European environmental policy did not only impose heavy costs on their weak fiscal 
capacities, as it was amounting about three to five percent of their GDPs (OECD countries 
spend between one and two percent of their GDP on environmental policy), but also meant to 
transfer regulations that were mostly alien to their political and economic systems as they clashed 
with the legacies of the socialist period. 
The main challenge of environmental enlargement can be seen in the sheer financial burden 
imposed by the adaptation of the green acquis into national law as well as the extensive follow-up 
costs implied. Adding to this, accession states also needed to increase their administrative 
capacity in order to transpose EU requirements as well as the technical expertise on the practical 
application of the law and the monitoring of compliance. Financial resources do not only allow 
acquiring additional personnel, expertise and technical equipment. They can also help pay off the 
delegation of implementation tasks to third actors and compensate potential losers of a policy 
(Börzel, 2003). Yet, even if a state has sufficient resources, its administration may still have 
difficulties in pooling and coordinating them, particularly if the required resources are dispersed 
among various public agencies and levels of government. In the three countries analyzed in this 
paper this is aggravated by the inherently weak standing of environmental administrations within 
governments that often prioritize economic development.  
Next to the financial burdens, a comprehensive environmental policy also needs the support of 
its target group. Essentially, environmental policy means high social costs with questionable 
revenues accomplished in the long term. This is seriously at odds with the low level of 
environmental engagement and a lack of public understanding and awareness of environmental 
concerns in most CEE states (Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2006, Lee and Norris, 2000). In such a 
situation the state needs the ability to engage different societal actors in the formulation and 
implementation of environmental policies - not only to get hold of their resources but also to 
enhance compliance. Turning to the case studies on the adoption of and adaptation to EU 
environmental policies in Hungary, Poland and Romania, the remaining part of this paper will 
inquire whether such new modes of governance have indeed emerged in the accession process.    7
4.  Cases Studies: Tracing NMG in Environmental Adaptation 
 
4.1 Environmental policy in Hungary  
The basic tenets of Hungarian environmental policy emerged in the seventies and the eighties 
when the predominant paradigm of policy was mostly based on national quality standards and 
pollution permits. Command-and-control regulations were accompanied by a system of largely 
nonsensical and incidental fines for non-compliance, levied by state authorities towards state-
owned enterprises (Caddy and Vari, 2002). By the early eighties environmental degradation 
caused by heavy industry became more than obvious and the state’s inability to solve these 
problems emerged as a major societal grievance leading to the appearance of a strong 
environmental movement. By effectively using the space provided by the legalization of free 
associations and the rise of public concern on environmental damages for political mobilization, 
the environmentalist groups belonged to the main drivers of democratic transition in Hungary, 
providing a safe haven also for other opposition groups (Enyedi and Szirmai, 1998). After the 
regime change the importance of the movement decreased permanently but it is still the most 
important and best organised segment of Hungarian civil society with a considerable number of 
professionalized groups actively engaging in policy-making and protest. While the liberalization 
of the political and economic sphere has provided space for the influx of new ideas and a more 
participatory policy-making process, many of the old bureaucratic practices still prevail and 
“[…]there has been little borrowing for the ideas of new public management and policy implementation and little 
looking beyond the profession of law and the drafting of regulations to mobilize people and resources efficiently” 
(O'Toole, 1997). The conflicting coexistence of these the “old” and the “new” administrative 
style became characteristic for environmental politics in Hungary and leads to a typically 
incremental policy process, which is further strengthened by politically motivated re-structuring 
within the national and regional environmental administration. While the Law on Environmental 
Protection of 1995 - already incorporating many basic elements of EU environmental legislation - 
was drafted after years of consultation with hundreds of organisations, environmental policy has 
a generally low standing both within government and parliament. With environmental 
administration fighting an uphill battle against more influential resorts like economy, transport or 
agriculture, EU accession emerged as a welcome opportunity both to further integrate and 
upgrade environmental policy and legislation, and to secure financing for environmental projects.  
Adopting and adapting to the environmental acquis in Hungary  
The accession process was accompanied by an initial wave of optimism in Hungarian 
environmental policy circles hoping that the lost momentum for reform during the nineties could 
be effectively relaunched with the help of EU adaptation pressure. First of all, EU pressure 
meant a quite complex process of legal implementation. The general perception was that there 
were relatively few major discrepancies between EU and Hungarian bodies of law, the main 
challenge lying in the lacking implementation of already existing legislation. In several cases, the 
legal implementation of EU requirements could build both on (often fragmentary) national 
legislation and established domestic actors. However, in most other cases the high time pressure 
from the European Commission demanding the swift transposition of the acquis was making 
systematic participation of non-state actors that would go further than consultations, largely 
improbable. Second, legal implementation pressure often came with the need to change national 
or regional level institutional settings of the environmental administration, effectively changing 
the institutional balance within the structure of the administration. On the national level, new 
focal points needed to be established in order to coordinate the workflow and manage the 
communication between regional, national and EU administrations. This has led, for example, to 
the establishment of an IPPC Unit at the National Environmental Institute or the Interministerial 
Strategic Coordination Committee on the WFD. On the regional level a major bottleneck beyond 
legal transposition of the FFH, WF, IPPC or EIA Directives was caused by the increased number   8
of permitting procedures traditionally managed by single media authorities. These were heavily 
overburdened by the growing quantity and complexity of the tasks to be performed, causing 
serious delays in the permitting procedure. Driven by both, EU push and calls for more 
efficiency by economic actors, the unification of the water management and environmental 
authorities in 2002 into a “unified green authority” created a set of new institutions through 
drawing the two authorities together. Third, the accession process provided non-state actors both 
with institutionalized access points and possibilities to become involved in the implementation of 
the policies. Directives such as the FFH, WF, or the EIA did systematically enforce possibilities 
for public participation, whereas the IPPC and WF directives gave economic actors a higher 
leverage. While most of these provisions become active only during the implementation process, 
in some cases non-state actors could already become active during the transposition period. For 
example, in the case of the FFH Directive, environmental stakeholders participated at all levels of 
the process. Thus, MME/BirdLife Hungary was actively involved in the designation of protected 
areas while local NGOs helped providing expertise and data. Fourth, EU accession provided 
additional financial possibilities for funding and exchange both for the administration as well as 
for non-state actors. Most of these funding were channeled through PHARE financed 
institutional twinning projects which brought together relevant stakeholders from old and new 
member states (Tulmets, 2005).  
 
For state administration, institutional restructuring together with the huge policy overload 
resulted in a quasi-permanent state of emergency during the accession period, that was absorbing 
most of the state capacities available. This perception of permanent change was even further 
aggravated by the changing composition of the environmental branch, which had a veritable 
odyssey behind itself that took it through different parts of the state administration, becoming 
consecutively united with the transport, water management, and agriculture as well as regional 
development administrations. In cases like the WFD implementation, where water management 
and environmental protection related epistemic communities share a long history of conflictual 
relations, these changes in affiliations have often resulted in serious frictions between the 
different policy communities forced to work closely together. The delayed transposition of the 
FFH directive can also be explained with deep-going conflicts between the agricultural and the 
environmental branch, which could not come to an agreement on using a common database for 
the designation of NATURA 2000 sites. Adding to this, high turnover rates within public 
administration due to its politicization and uncompetitive salaries are hindering the consolidation 
within the departments and the stabilization of external ties. EU membership did not lead to a 
consolidation of civil service either, as cuttings in government spending seriously demises the 
administrative capacities of the environmental authorities. Relations within government, between 
branches of state administration or even within one ministry were often accompanied by high 
transaction costs, new modes of governance, systematically including non-state actors could 
hardly emerge. 
 
Paradoxically, while state actors both on the national and the regional levels were highly 
overburdened by the rising quantity and complexity of issues to be managed, they could also not 
mobilize enough capacity to make use of new modes of governance that would seriously 
discharge them. As several studies and workshops, most of them financed through PHARE 
funds, were organized in order to promote these ideas, this could not be a matter of missing 
information (Center for Environmental Studies, 2003, Kajner et al., 2002). New modes of 
governance, such as “voluntary agreements”, could not materialize due to legal uncertainties 
attributed to such procedures during times of EU – induced profound legal change. As the 
incoherence of the legal system is still rampant, fears from litigations are widespread. Adding to 
this, capacity problems to monitor compliance with such new and non-binding agreements and 
the fears of misinterpreting differential handling of business actors as corrupt practice by the 
public are prompting state administration to shy away from making use of such instruments.    9
While the EU adaptation process created opportunity structures for non-state actors to become 
more actively involved in the policy process, the non-emergence of new modes of governance 
can be also attributed to certain characteristics of non-state actors in Hungary. First of all, the 
capacities of sectoral business organizations strength is often limited and while claims about the 
general weakness of civil society in Hungary can be questioned (Stark et al., 2006, Petrova and 
Tarrow, 2007), a high level of specific policy expertise facilitating inclusion in the environmental 
policy process is mostly lacking. A second hindering factor lies in the specific heritage and 
identity of most environmental organizations that is clearly biased towards confrontation rather 
than cooperation of the state (Hajba, 1994). However, organizations with strong policy-making 
resources are able to follow double-edged strategies: while WWF-Hungary is a main partner of 
state administration in several projects regarding the WF directive and is developing a new, public 
participation based approach by initiating a innovative pilot river basin management plan on the 
Dráva river (Bera, 2005) it also filed a complaint to the European Commission against Hungary’s 
non-WFD compliant definition of “water services”. Third, certain recent changes made in the 
environmental administration, induced by the more integrated character of permitting, did in fact 
increase the secretiveness of the policy process. Fourth, uncertainties connected to the use non-
binding regulations push even business actors affected by the IPPC directive to insist on 
“hardening” these initially soft instruments for the everyday administrative use. 
 
The generally low emergence of new modes of governance does not mean, however, that 
consultations do not take place. State administration can selectively resort to long-established, 
formal and informal contacts towards relevant business associations, scientific background 
institutions or NGOs. Hand-picking the partners for consultation has several advantages. First, it 
could mobilize effectively relevant cognitive resources not available for the administration. 
Second, it could filter participation including only loyal and trusted non-state actors. Third, it 
made possible to do this in a timely manner so that it did not contradict with the strict 
transposition schedule dictated by the EU. Fourth, such contacts could be used to obtain 
legitimacy and fulfill legal requirements demanding public participation. This also shows that 
provisions laid down in the directive enforcing public participation do not necessarily create 
balanced representation between environmental and technical interest as these are managed 
through inclusive, but “cartelized” extensive policy networks that effectively bridge the state-non-
state actor divide, are highly professional and can attract resources in a flexible ways. They both 
carry legitimizing potential for state policies and ensure at the same time through their 
embeddedness into the professional community that public participation provisions do not 
undermine the position of the consolidated main actors.  
While Hungarian environmental policy-making is still largely dominated by state actors, there are 
evidences for the slow proliferation of inclusive steering methods. Most importantly, a clear EU 
push to include non-state actors can account for this. Second, it can be also a result of policy-
learning and the establishment of trust relations, often connected to contacts and positive 
experiences made in PHARE financed twinning projects. Third, delayed transposition and 
implementation, due to lacking administrative capacities can also result in taking the “helping 
hand” of non-state actors. After Hungary was missing the transposition deadline agreed with the 
European Commission mostly due to low administrative capacities and conflicts within different 
branches in the government (Mocsári 2004), the ministry decided to delegate an information 
campaign about the designation process to the “NATURA 2000 Coalition” formed by some of 
the most powerful NGOs. While this increased the legitimacy of government policies, it could 
effectively prevent a threatening complaint in Brussels which was announced by this NGO 
coalition if the administration does not proceed with the designation process.  
Financial capacities available to non-state actors were of high importance in shaping relations 
with the authorities. In the case of the IPPC directive highly competitive, mostly export-oriented 
industry branches, (e.g. pharmaceuticals) had no problems in playing a proactive role in designing 
BATs, but small and medium enterprises from the agricultural sector are faced with capacity   10
problems they can hardly solve. Also the case of the EIA Directive is telling here. As introducing 
impact assessment principles was already among the main political requirements during 
environmental protests of the late eighties, a quite active and internationally well-connected 
expert community on this issue was highly influential in Hungary. Holding the relevant expertise, 
non-state actors like the Environmental Management and Law Association (EMLA) and Öko 
Inc. were contracted to draft EIA legislation and advise Hungary during accession negotiations.  
4.2 Environmental policy in Poland 
Poland hosts some of the most valuable ecosystems in Europe, which suffered from decades of 
industrialization and an inefficient centrally planned economy.  After the collapse of the 
communist regime, one of the numerous challenges was to set up an efficient environmental 
policy. Environmental legislation already existed before 1989, but suffered from inadequate 
charges and undeveloped markets (Żylicz, 2000, Żylicz and Holzinger, 2000).  
To a limited extent, ecological activism was the only societal activity that was tolerated during 
communism in Poland. Therefore, unsurprisingly, an ecological “sub-table” was established at the 
round table talks between Solidarity and the communist regime, which started in 1989. It was 
agreed that the then environmental law should be codified within two years. However, only a few 
amendments of the old Environmental Protection Act of 1980 were adopted and with these 
amendments, Poland tried to fit the environmental law into the new conditions of market 
economy and democracy (Jendroska and Bar, 2005). It lasted until 2001 until a new 
comprehensive Environmental Protection Act was passed. The main reason for the difficult and 
delayed creation process of a new environmental law was the instability of power relations; 
frequent changes of government and the resulting rejections of governmental drafts in parliament 
lead to a “chaotic” legislation process (Sommer and Rotko, 1999). 
Cooperation of state and non-state actors in Poland is difficult, as corporatist traditions are 
missing and the relationship of the two groups is often marked by mistrust and the lacking 
political will to give societal groups a real say in decision making. Soon after the regime change 
environmental concerns were high on the political agenda in Poland, but with the vast economic 
reforms interest in ecological issues faded and shifted to more pressing social issues (Żylicz, 2000: 
9).  The missing environmental awareness of the Polish population is often addressed as a 
hindering reason for efficient implementation of environmental legislation. There are a variety of 
environmental NGOs in Poland, but there are only few specialized groups who can hark back on 
secure founding. A specific feature of the environmental movement in Poland is the loose 
organizational structures between the specific NGOs. Notwithstanding, new opportunity 
structures have been opened for them by the Polish EU membership. NGOs are quite successful 
to exercise pressure on their national government by means of the European Commission. The 
same holds true for the state-industry relationship. Several industrial sectors are still mainly state-
owned and therefore have a different position vis-à-vis the authorities and a different access to 
decision making arenas compared to privatized ones. This is also mirrored in the organization of 
business interests, as sectors, where foreign investment plays a crucial role, are better organized 
than the others.  
Adopting and adapting to the environmental acquis in Poland 
In Polish environmental policy making a command and control approach prevails with some 
nascent forms of non-state actor involvement in form of outsourcing, consultations and 
hierarchically dominated cooperation of public and private actors. Generally, we can say that this 
development is a result of weak financial and administrative capacities and the missing tradition 
of collaboration of state and non-state actors. During communism societal activity was repressed 
for decades and this is still visible in the missing communication arenas and the related 
inexperience of the two actor groups to deal with each other. Only in some cases, a cautious 
change towards more interaction can be observed. This development arises on the one hand   11
from EU requirements that push for private actor involvement and the learning effects of the 
cases where collaboration brings out good results. On the other hand, in some cases a mutual 
dependency of state and non-state actors and the allocation of resources non-state actors can 
provide, is the main driving force for increased cooperation.  
However, the Polish state did not mobilize the resources of non-state actors in a systematic way. 
One hindering factor for the augmented inclusion of non-state actors in environmental policy 
making are the unstable power relations within the Polish state that led to a slow and unreliable 
legislative process. This is for example visible in the transposition of the EIA directive. The 
Environmental Legislation Act, the main document regulating the environment in Poland, only 
came into force in 2001. The EIA procedure, however, was quickly transposed in the late 1990s 
in order to secure EU funding but was, as a consequence, often criticized by the European 
Commission for not fulfilling the requirements to open up the process for the involvement of 
non-state actors. The instability of power relations has also negative effects for the willingness of 
non-state actors to bring in their resources because they have to fear that the political will 
changes and agreements reached with the preceding governments are not realized.  
Next to the slow and somehow inconsistent legislation process, the environmental acquis is 
technically oriented and the European policy principles partly clashed with the traditions of the 
old legal system and administrative culture, which made the effective implementation of the 
finally reached regulations even more difficult. The administrative bodies are often overburdened 
with the practical application of the new law and, at the same time, they lack experience and 
know-how, how to negotiate with different kinds of non-state actors or how to monitor informal 
accords or voluntary agreements. State actors do not have sufficient capacities that give them 
enough security to involve non-state actors in the policy process, even in cases where they are 
dependent on resources of non state actors. In the case of the IPPC directive, the cooperation of 
state and non-state actors is a necessity in order to handle the challenge, posed by the European 
regulations. Private actors, especially companies and consultants are included in the preparation 
of national guidance documents for integrated permits as required by the directive. The 
incentives for state actors to include non-state actors are their resources, especially know-how 
and manpower, but also their financial contributions. Nevertheless, the non-state actors always 
remain in a precarious position; although they are involved, the standards set remain very strict, 
as authorities fear state capture. The missing competence of state actors, especially concerning 
the technical details of the directive, leads to stricter standards than necessary.  
If missing state capacities are paired with missing political will to implement a directive, 
reinforced by political veto-players on the regional level, collaboration is refused by state actors 
even when offered. In case of the FFH Directive, it was only the external pressure from the EU 
Commission that made the Polish administration cooperate with non-state actors. After 
environmental groups had prepared a so-called “shadow list”, listing far more possible 
conservation areas then included in the “official list” of the Ministry of Environment,  the 
European Commission demanded a revision. As a consequence, NGOs were entitled to draw up 
parts of the inventory because the Ministry of the Environment recognized their superior 
expertise. An interesting dilemma, which is somehow characteristic for the implementation of 
most environmental directives in Poland, can be observed. On the one hand, the expertise of the 
non-state actors is needed, on the other hand, they are not (equally) involved in policy making 
because of missing trust relations.  
Some additional factors may reverse the described situation.  As a consequence of institutional 
restructuring competencies in environmental management were transferred to the regional level 
but only minor financial resources were allocated to them. On the one hand, this further weakens 
the administrative capacities of regional authorities, whereas, on the other hand, in some cases 
exactly this increased pressure favours the emergence of collaboration. This may be a reason, why 
more non-state actor involvement is found on the regional level in Poland. In the practical 
application of the WF directive, councils and commissions for public participation and broad   12
consultation processes were introduced on the level of the regional water management 
authorities. First, this reflects the specific EU requirements that were anchored in the national 
water law. Second, special twinning projects, which actively forced public participation 
procedures in pilot river basins, promoted this development. In contrast, it is remarkable that the 
establishment of similar national water councils took far more time and its work is assessed more 
critically by the involved stakeholders. This shows that missing administrative and financial 
capacities, together with EU pressure and external policy learning, are favourable for the 
inclusion of non-state actors in order to allocate resources. However, decentralisation alone 
makes no new modes of governance. As the empirical investigations show, cooperation is more 
likely in cases where at least a certain level of capacities is available to authorities, enabling them 
to remain in charge of the policy process. Water Management has a long tradition in Poland and 
therefore the authorities can hark back on technical capacities, long transition periods are 
granted, which gives them more time to elaborate and monitor agreements, and money from the 
state budget is allocated to the regional units in order to establish public participation. By 
contrast, the reorganisation of the Drinking Water sector is much more sensible. The costs 
therefore have to be born to a large extent by the local municipalities, which were put in charge 
of water and waste water utilities in the early 1990s, and the consumers. The involvement of 
profit-oriented non-state actors could help local governments to cope with the necessary 
investments. While Polish law provides for the possibility of minority shareholding and joint 
ownership of water companies, local decision-makers are not inclined to cooperate with private 
companies. Their reluctance can be traced back to the fear too loose the control over this 
important public sector and that costs for consumers might rise enormously and hence weaken 
their position. In turn, non-state actor must have the needed resources and must be willing to 
offer them respectively. An important factor is the financial backing of non-state actor 
organizations.  
In sum, hierarchical coordination is still dominant in Polish environmental policy making, mainly 
due to missing administrative capacities and missing trust relations between state and non-state 
actors. Specific EU requirements that push for involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, 
external policy learning in form of twinning, and decentralization can, under certain conditions, 
positively influence the emergence of new modes of governance. Mutual dependence of state and 
non-state actors or a strong need of relatively weak states for resources non-state actors can offer 
alone is not decisive.  
4.3 Environmental policy in Romania   
Like most other states of the region, Romanian environmental legislation was based on single-
media permits prior to 1989 but law enforcement was generally weak and extensive industrial 
production was prioritized (Dragomirescu et al., 1998). The Ministry of Environment was 
established after the political changes in 1990 (renamed 2007 to the Ministry of Environment and 
Sustainable Development), which drafted a comprehensive Environmental Law in 1995. This 
included rather progressive legal instruments, but the weakness of the environmental resort, both 
in political and financial terms, was effectively hindering their usage. The EU accession process 
gave a new and forceful impetus leading to wide-ranging changes both of environmental 
administration and the relationship between the state and non-state actors active in this sector.  
Romania was the last candidate country to open negotiations on Chapter 22 of the acquis 
communitaire. Environmental issues emerged as a major stumbling block on the countries road 
towards accession as Romania received a warning “red flag” in the last regular EC Country report 
before accession in 2005, meaning that the countries accession could be postponed because of 
the lacking progress in the adaptation process. Two main problems can be seen accounting for 
this. First, the weak political and administrative capacity to draft, monitor and enforce legislation 
(Krüger and Carius, 2001). Second, lack of finances earmarked for the transposition and 
implementation of this very cost intensive chapter – the costs of environmental accessions were   13
estimated to reach € 29, 3 billion, half of Romania’s GDP a year (ECOTEC, 2000, DANCEE, 
2003). As Romania is an accession “late-comer” it did not finalize its institutional consolidation 
to the extent the first wave of accession states had. Due to extremely weak state capacities, 
including staffing on the national, regional and local levels, constant institutional and legal re-
shuffling processes and the tight deadlines dictated by the EU, the public administration has 
largely chosen to muddle-through the adaptation and implementation process. Being under 
constant pressure from stronger ministries and struggling with high fragmentation, environmental 
policy usually harked back to the traditions of legalism and the dominance of command and 
control instruments, which resonate well with the traditional administrative style of the country.  
Unlike several other CEE states, where environmental issues were central to the protest 
movements of the late eighties, in Romania the strongly authoritarian political system prevented 
the existence of any kind of parallel organizations. Although based on some pre-war traditions 
the environmental movement could soon recover after 1989, it is mostly organized on the local 
level, is financially dependent on external donors and remains mostly passive in lobbying or 
influencing policy-making. However, partially related to EU accession, this has been changing in 
the last couple of years. 
 
Adopting and adapting to the environmental acquis in Romania  
Romania started the accession race with extremely weak capacities in the administrative sector: 
coordination between national, regional and local levels was largely unconsolidated, monitoring 
and law enforcement scattered and corruption widespread (Craciun, 2006). Public administration 
was often understaffed and as a heritage of socialist environmental policies, its training largely 
technically biased. Due to the low wages in the public sector, personnel fluctuation remained a 
constant problem. While stop-and-go reforms and reshufflings did occur during the nineties, 
mostly due to bilateral foreign assistance, it was EU accession that has clearly emerged as a main 
driving force behind a number of changes of the last decade. First of all, the transposition of 
community legislation has resulted in an vast legal activism of the ministry. Due to the strict time 
schedule of the accession, dictated by the EU and domestically reinforced by the powerful 
Ministry of European Integration, this process was taking place mainly ad-hoc and new 
legislation was introduced into national law mainly by emergency ordinances of the government 
thus circumventing the Parliament. Second, EU accession resulted in a major institutional 
reorganization of the ministry, which led, among others, to the introduction of a new, regional 
level of environmental administration and the reorganization of the Environmental Guard, that 
could not efficiently fulfill its law enforcing functions due to unclear institutional dependencies 
and widespread corruption. Third, EU accession increased the participative opportunities for 
non-state actors through the legal provisions of horizontal directives such as EIA or IPPC. While 
during the rather secretive accession process participation of non-state actors in some cases even 
declined compared to the mid-nineties, legal provisions of these directives are being increasingly 
used during the last years by the civil society actors. Finally, EU accession provided cognitive, 
technical and financial means in order to fulfill the requirements of the directives. Targeting both, 
state and non-state actors, PHARE twinning projects, LIFE and ISPA instruments, often stocked 
up with bilateral aid funds from the EU member states, were partially financing new facilities or 
linking together policy actors (Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004). 
 
Despite of this external capacity-building support, new modes of governance were far from 
emerging as a typical feature of environmental enlargement in Romania. First, the high time 
pressure on legal adaptation, which was even higher in the case of the two laggard accession 
candidates, Romania and Bulgaria, was effectively binding the limited resources available in the 
environmental administration. The heavily understaffed und underpaid administration on both 
the national and the regional level tended to see the inclusion of non-state actors as a time   14
consuming and non-rewarding exercise. In most of the cases, second, the perception prevailed 
that the drafting guidelines of the EU did not provide much leeway for domestic fitting, but 
rather led to a “downloading” of the legislation followed by the “copy-paste method” of 
transposition. Third, institutional restructuring and conflicts within the administration, as in the 
case of the FFH directive, between the forestry department of the agricultural ministry and the 
biodiversity department of environmental ministry did not leave much capacity to include more 
actors in the policy process. Together, fourth, with the administrative culture, which tends to be 
legalistic and technically oriented, this can be seen as hindering the establishment of trust 
relations between state and non state actors. While it was mostly weak state capacity, that 
hindered the emergence of new modes of governance in Romanian environmental policy-making, 
in some cases, the relatively strong capacities available to state actors, such as the National 
Administration “Romanian Waters”, did not make the pooling of resources from non-state actors 
necessary. As in several sectors, such as energy, Romanian governments did prevent large 
privatization, the state ownership of the most Large Combustion Plants made the new modes of 
governance futile. While non-state actors were often targeted by the new legislation, typically they 
did not seek institutionalized ways of asserting influence on state administration. In several cases, 
corporatist relations between business actors, politics and administration survived the 
restructuring of Romanian industry (Cernat, 2006), making, thus, informal relations an easier way 
to achieve their aims. At the same time, sectoral business associations tend to be still weak in 
Romania, as are, in most cases, environmental NGOs.  
As capacity-building, financed mainly through EU funds such as PHARE, LIFE or ISPA and the 
explicit recommendations of the EU to increase staff in certain areas slowly improved the 
administrative capacities available to the state, more inclusive policy-circles started to emerge. 
Even if reluctantly, explicit EU push to include non-state actors can be seen as resulting in a 
slowly emerging trend. Adding to this, trust relations fostered though longer periods of 
collaboration between state and non-state actors seem to have similar effects. While EIA 
adaptation has happened under time pressure and by command and control measures, there 
seems to be more openness in the implementation since the EU tries to promote the process. 
This might open doors to more systematic collaboration with the non-state sector, as some of the 
NGOs already possess relevant knowledge and are involved in spreading the information on 
EIA. At the same time, EIA provisions are likely to emerge as a highly politicised issue, as they 
are increasingly discovered by environmental groups as a tool in blocking regional development 
projects. The case of the Rosia Montana Gold Mine, where several NGOs are effectively using 
EIA and which is partly owned by the Romanian state, has become a highly meditated 
environmental conflict and a first major experimental field to test the power of such new tools. 
Apart of these, mostly externally influenced, ways to promote new modes of governance specific 
capacities available to non-state actors can, in some cases, lead to shared ownership. The FFH 
Directive seems to provide the most potential for this, as highly professional NGOs holding 
relevant and scarcely available knowledge, such as SOR/BirdLife Romania or the Milvus Group 
signed a partnership agreement with the Ministry for cooperation on designating bird areas 
(SPAs). However, also in this case funding came mainly through EU programmes such as 
PHARE CBC and LIFE. Due to the delays in the process public consultations on site 
designation did not take place and are expected to lead to conflicts in the future. Even in this 
case, the collaboration between NGOs and the administrations can be characterized as 
maintaining the shadow of hierarchy and being contractual and selective. Another path leading to 
active inclusion of non-state actors is related to the high costs posed by investment heavy 
directives such as the Drinking Water, IPPC or the LCP directive. Public utility reform in the 
nineties led to municipal ownership and as local self-governments were chronically lacking 
finances, in some cases concessionary public-private partnerships (PPP) with the participation of 
typically foreign public utility companies emerged. EU funding directly, or through associated 
financial institutions as the European Investment Bank, has helped the deregulation process to 
develop. It can also be expected that this tendency will proliferate further, as initial financing   15
through Public-Private Partnership concessions can be instrumental to kick-start investments in 
order to apply for further EU funding. Finally, collaboration between state and non-state actors 
can occur also to prevent or to postpone compliance with EU legislation. In the case of the LCP 
and IPPC Directives, which mainly target industrial actors, informal agreements with the 
administration emerged in order to negotiate individual transition periods for installation reaching 
up to 10 years for more than one fourth of the installations affected by these directives.  
5. Conclusion  
 
The adoption and adaptation to the EU’s environmental acquis posed serious challenges to both, 
state and non-state actors in Hungary, Poland and Romania. The transfer of European 
environmental policies came with significant costs compared to the weak state capacities and 
meant a thorough legal and institutional reshuffling based on regulations that were often 
contradicting the policy-making traditions of these states. Given the limited capacities of state 
actors, the inclusion of non-state actors in policy transposition and implementation is an obvious 
possibility to compensate for state weakness. New forms of governance, such as co-regulation, 
delegation or private self-regulation can be seen as potentially providing ways to reduce the 
implementation burden by sharing it with private actors.  
However, based on the analysis of the adoption and adaptation process of six environmental 
directives in Hungary, Poland and Romania, this study finds that this is not the case in these 
accession states. Full-fledged new modes of governance practically did not emerge during the 
accession period. The traditional command and control approach prevailed in all three countries 
and in some cases was even reinforced by the high time pressure of the enlargement process. 
There are only some nascent forms of cooperation with non-state actors emerging. Generally, 
even these remain weak and non-systematic and include rather weak participative modes such as 
outsourcing, consultation or asymmetrical cooperation. Systematically involving non-state actors 
is mainly perceived as time-consuming and non-rewarding. If pressure is exercised to include 
non-state actors, either from the EU or also by domestic actors, there are signs of a more 
inclusive involvement. However, public administration is often perceived to merely pay lip-
service to EU requirements for public participation. 
The main reasons hindering the emergence of new modes of governance are the weak 
administrative and enabling capacities of the state as well as weaknesses concerning private 
interest organization. Accession coincided with transition. On the one hand, managing the 
transition process required a strong government to introduce and implement often costly political 
and economic reforms. On the other hand, the transition process entailed high political and 
institutional uncertainties, which are reinforced by frequent changes in government and 
administration. This makes it difficult for non-state actors to establish stable relationships with 
state actors. Furthermore, Central and Eastern European countries share an institutional legacy 
of an authoritarian state that heavily interfered with society and economy. The organization of 
societal and corporate interests used to be weak. Even after transition, structures of interest 
intermediation remain fragile. Thus, systematically involving non-state actors in the making and 
implementation of public policy does neither resonate well with the traditional paradigm of a 
strong state nor can it build on stable state-society relations. Societal and economic interests 
often lack the necessary resources and/or the political willingness to organize and offer 
themselves as reliable partners to the state. In those cases, in which non-state actors did manage 
to organize, it often needed the help of transnational actors, such as international environmental 
organizations, policy consultancies, companies, or EU-level confederations. Paradoxically, state 
actors are reluctant to cooperate with non-state actors precisely because they lack resources 
which non-state actors may provide. It is exactly because of their weakness that state actors are 
afraid of being captured by powerful interests, who have superior expertise regarding the making 
of rules and cannot be monitored in their compliance.    16
While these findings are consistent across the case studies, the paper also finds variance regarding 
policies, time and countries. Regarding policy variance, policies with clear provisions towards 
participatory mechanisms, such as the FFH, IPPC and WF directives seem to hold more 
potential towards generating new modes of governance compared to the classical “old-style” 
regulatory directives. Time variance in the emergence of participatory politics can be explained 
mainly through the increased trust and cross-dependencies fostered in longer periods of non-
systematic collaboration between state and non-state actors. Differences between the 
transposition and implementation period, as well as pre- and post-accession period are also 
telling, as the opening up of the multi-level governance system of the EU provide more 
connection possibilities for the non-state actors. This mainly explains the variance between 
countries, as this paper finds less inclusive policy-making in Romania, which has joined the EU in 
the second wave of accession in 2007.  
Nonetheless, some observed developments cause hope for the emergence of new modes of 
governance. Decentralization, the specific EU requirements for participatory approaches and 
external policy learning increase cooperation. EU and international aid strengthen the capacities 
of state and non-state actors and therefore capacity problems hindering the cooperation may 
become levelled in the long run. At the moment, it is too early to make a clear statement, if these 
developments will really lead to more participatory structures in the future, as the practical 
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